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Abstract
At arbitrary prices of commodities and assets, fix-price equilibria exist under weak assumptions:
endowments need not satisfy an interiority condition, utility functions need only satisfy a very weak
monotonicity requirement, and the asset return matrix allows for redundant assets. Prices of assets
may permit arbitrage. At equilibrium, though restricted through endogenously determined trading
constraints, arbitrage possibilities may persist; in an example, an individual holds an arbitrage
portfolio. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: D45; D52; D60
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1. Introduction
Trade occurs at prices different from competitive equilibrium prices; this is the case in
active, competitive markets, asset markets in particular, where prices adjust while purchases
and sales are carried out.
The study of markets and the allocations that they generate requires a consistent descrip-
tion of the exchanges that occur at arbitrary prices of commodities and assets. In the market
microstructure literature, market makers absorb discrepancies between supply and demand.
Here, endogenous bounds on purchases or sales yield market clearing.
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The problem that arises is to take the consequences of excess supply and excess demand
into account in a way that is consistent both with individual optimization and with the
transparency of markets. The definition of a fix-price equilibrium introduced by Bénassy
(1975) and Drèze (1975) under certainty extends to economies with uncertainty and an
incomplete asset market.
Equilibria exist under extremely weak assumptions. Any assumption on the interiority
of individual endowments or on positive aggregate endowments is absent. That minimum
wealth is not crucial in models with price rigidities and rationing was observed in Herings
(1996); there endogenously emerging constraints might give rise to minimum wealth points.
Here, the endowments of individuals may lie on the boundaries of their consumption sets,
and the asset market is incomplete; this generality is important in settings with time and
uncertainty.
The payoffs of assets are not restricted. With the prices of commodities fixed, assets may
be nominal, numeraire or real. More importantly, the asset return matrix need not have full
column rank. Redundant assets are allowed, which gives rise to difficulties in the argument
for existence, as it is now not trivial to compactify budget sets. To restrict attention to a
subset of independent assets is not appropriate: in the presence of trading constraints, an
individual may wish to trade in several collinear assets.
The prices of assets may allow for arbitrage. The logical consequence of arbitrage op-
portunities is that all individuals want to exploit them, and therefore all individuals tend to
be on the same side of asset markets that are used to construct an arbitrage portfolio. An
individual performing arbitrage will therefore have difficulties in finding trading partners
on the other side of the markets. This generates endogenous trading constraints that limit
arbitrage opportunities. An important question is whether indeed arbitrage possibilities are
completely eliminated by the endogenous trading constraints. Surprisingly, this turns out
not to be the case. In an example, an individual holds an arbitrage portfolio at equilibrium,
that is supplied, collectively, by the others.
The existence of competitive equilibria was proved by Arrow and Debreu (1954) and
McKenzie (1954) in great generality. Crucial to the result, however, was the effective absence
of uncertainty. With uncertainty and an incomplete asset market, the existence of competitive
equilibria poses important problems.
For the simplest case, with nominal assets, denominated in units of account, or numeraire
assets, equilibrium existence results are given in Werner (1985) and Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1986). But even in this case, strong convexity and monotonicity assump-
tions on preferences are not sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium when individual
endowments of some commodities are allowed to be zero in some states. Counterexamples
to existence were given in Gottardi and Hens (1996). They also provided sufficient condi-
tions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium in the case of numeraire assets, which
include strict monotonicity and strict quasi-concavity of the utility function and a strictly
positive aggregate endowment as well as a resource relatedness assumption on individual
endowments, which strengthens the assumption in McKenzie (1959, 1961). In models with
time and uncertainty, even such conditions appear strong, as it is quite likely that in some
states of the world certain commodities are not available.
For the case of real assets, a counterexample to existence was given in Hart (1975). A
partial rescue of the model relies on the results of Duffie and Shafer (1985), who obtained
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a generic existence result. However, strong differentiability and monotonicity assumptions
on utility functions were employed. More importantly, genericity in the payoffs of assets
is particularly disturbing; also, for assets whose payoffs are not linear in the prices of
commodities, such as options, though Krasa and Werner (1991) obtained generic existence,
it is also possible to obtain robust counterexamples to existence, as in Polemarchakis and
Ku (1990).
One can argue that, when a competitive equilibrium does not exist, prices of commodities
and assets do emerge against which trade takes place. The determination of such prices
would require the specification of a complicated dynamic process. The failure in explaining
why prices are rigid and why quantities adjust faster than prices can be considered as a
general drawback of the fix-price approach. At least three approaches to explain the rigidity
of prices are taken in the fix-price literature. There are models with endogenous price setting
of agents with market power, see for instance Bénassy (1988) or Bonanno (1990). Drèze
and Gollier (1993) and Drèze (2001) argue that price rigidities are a response to market
incompleteness. This argument is particularly valid for the two forms of underemployment
of resources most frequently encountered, unemployed labor and excess capacities, two clear
examples of commodities for which future markets are hardly developed. Finally, Herings
(1997) and Tuinstra (2000) show that political interference in the market mechanism can
be rational from a partisan point of view and might be responsible for sustained deviations
from prices that clear the markets. Here, we consider the more modest hypothesis that the
prices at which trade takes place are given.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, the assumptions,
and the equilibrium concept. The possible redundancy of the asset return matrix calls for a
closer analysis of the set of feasible allocations of assets. In Section 3, the so-called minimal
effective feasible allocations of assets are considered, and they are shown to be bounded.
Section 4 gives a proof of the existence of equilibrium, and Section 5 illustrates the concepts
by analyzing the counterexample to existence of a competitive equilibrium that is given in
Hart (1975). Sections 6 and 7 consider the arbitrage opportunities that may be present
at equilibrium. Section 6 gives some positive results on the impossibility of performing
arbitrage. Section 7 shows the limitations of those results, by means of the example that has
been alluded to before.
2. The economy
The economy is the standard two-period general equilibrium model with incomplete
asset markets and numeraire assets. Transactions occur in assets before and in commodities
after the state of nature is known. An economy E = ((X i , ui, ei)i∈I , R(p, q)) consists of
consumption sets X i , utility functions ui and endowments ei for all individuals i ∈ I, and
an asset return matrix R(p, q) that specifies the payoffs of assets in each state of nature in
units of account at prices of commodities p and prices of assets q.
States of the world are s ∈ S = {1, . . . ,S} and commodities are l ∈ L = {1, . . . , L+1}.
At state s, commodity (L + 1, s) is assumed to be a numeraire commodity, so its price is
pL+1,s = 1. The domain of prices of commodities is P = {p ∈ R(L+1)S : pL+1,s = 1,
s ∈ S}. Assets are a ∈ A = {1, . . . , A + 1}. Asset A + 1 is assumed to be a numeraire
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asset, its price is qA+1 = 1. The domain of prices of assets isQ = {q ∈ RA+1 : qA+1 = 1}.
Commodities other than the numeraire are Lˇ = {1, . . . , L}, and assets other than the
numeraire are Aˇ = {1, . . . , A}.
The numeraire asset plays the role of the medium of exchange before the state of nature is
known. After the state of nature has been realized, say the state of nature is s, the numeraire
commodity (L+1, s)performs this role. Following Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986),
it can be shown that a model with first period consumption is a special case of our model.
A utility function ui is weakly monotonically increasing in the numeraire commodity in
every state of the world if, for all xi ∈ X i , for s ∈ S, for k ≥ 0, ui(xi+k1(L+1)s) ≥ ui(xi),
where 1j denotes the j -th unit vector of appropriate dimension. Weak monotonicity in the
numeraire commodity means that an individual that is given more of the numeraire commod-
ity is not worse off. In particular, it does not exclude noxious non-numeraire commodities
or a numeraire commodity that does not enter in the utility function of the individual.
The economy satisfies the following assumptions.
A1. For every individual i, the consumption set is X i = R(L+1)S+ .
A2. For every individual i, the utility function is continuous, quasi-concave and weakly
monotonically increasing in the numeraire commodity in every state of the world.
A3. For every individual i, the endowment is an element of the consumption set, ei ∈ X i .
The endowments are an arbitrary element of the consumption set. No strict positivity
assumptions are made. The realistic case that individuals do not possess many commodities
or even that some commodities are totally unavailable in certain states of the world is not
excluded. This makes it for instance possible to model uncertain outcomes of research and
development.
No restrictions are made on the payoffs of assets. Assets may be nominal, numeraire
or real. The payoffs of assets may be non-linear in commodity prices, as is the case with
options. The asset return matrix need not have full column rank. Redundant assets are
allowed for.
Under Assumptions A1–A3, a competitive equilibrium may not exist, as follows from the
counterexamples to existence of Hart (1975), Polemarchakis and Ku (1990), and Gottardi
and Hens (1996). We take the point of view that even when a competitive equilibrium does
not exist, some prices of commodities and assets will emerge against which trade takes
place. The explanation of the prices at which trade will eventually take place would require
the specification of a complicated dynamic process, which is beyond the scope of the present
paper. We start out from the more modest hypothesis that the prices at which trade will take
place are given. The challenge is to take into account in a consistent way the consequences
of excess supply and excess demand.
We analyse the allocation that results given any terms of trade, that is at any given prices
of commodities p¯ ∈ P and any given prices of assets q¯ ∈ Q. No assumptions are made on
p¯ and q¯, except that they belong to P and Q. In particular, no non-negativity assumptions
are imposed on prices of commodities. Since no monotonicity requirements are imposed
on non-numeraire commodities, such non-negativity assumptions would not make sense.
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In certain cases, it might make sense to restrict attention to prices of assets q¯ that exclude
arbitrage opportunities. Since our analysis is valid for all prices in Q, such an assumption
is not made. The asset return matrix at prices (p¯, q¯) is R¯ = R(p¯, q¯).
At arbitrary terms of trade, a competitive equilibrium is typically ruled out. In general,
excess supply and excess demand occurs. The specification of an allocation that is consistent
with the prices (p¯, q¯), with optimizing behavior of individuals, and with transparent markets
is non-trivial.
In markets for commodities and assets other than the numeraire, endogenously determined
rationing on net trades serves to attain market clearing. To keep the presentation as simple as
possible, rationing is assumed to be uniform across individuals.1 In case of excess supply
in a market, all suppliers will therefore have equal, but limited, opportunities to supply.
The limited supply opportunities have spillovers to other markets, which may introduce
rationing constraints in markets that cleared before. Rationing in the supply (demand) of
commodities other than the numeraire is z
¯
∈ −RLs+ (z¯ ∈ RLs+ ). Rationing in the supply
(demand) of assets other than the numeraire is y
¯
∈ −RA+ (y¯ ∈ RA+).
At rationing scheme (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯), the budget set of individual i is
βi(z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯) = (xi, yi) ∈ X i × RA+1 :


q¯yi ≤ 0,
p¯s(x
i
s − eis) ≤ R¯syi, s ∈ S,
y
¯
a
≤ yia ≤ y¯a, a ∈ Aˇ,
z
¯
l,s ≤ xil,s − eil,s ≤ z¯l,s , (l, s)∈ Lˇ×S
The optimization problem of the individual is to choose a utility maximizing consumption
bundle and asset portfolio in his budget set. The set of such consumption bundles and asset
portfolios is δi(z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯).
At a given rationing scheme, an individual is effectively rationed in his supply (demand)
for a commodity or an asset if he could increase his utility when the rationing scheme
in the supply (demand) of that commodity or asset is removed. There is effective supply
(demand) rationing in the market for a commodity or an asset if at least one individual is
effectively rationed in his supply (demand) for this commodity or asset. Prices (p¯, q¯) admit
a competitive equilibrium if all markets clear without effective rationing. This makes the
concept of competitive equilibrium a special case of the notion here.2
Definition 2.1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium for the economy E at prices (p¯, q¯) is a pair
((x∗, y∗), (z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗)) such that
1. for every individual, (xi∗, yi∗) ∈ δi(z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗),
2.
∑I
i=1 xi∗ =
∑I
i=1 ei and
∑I
i=1 yi∗ = 0,
3. for every l ∈ Lˇ, if for some i′xi′∗l,s − ei
′
l,s = z
¯
∗
l,s , then for all i ∈ Ixi∗l,s − eil,s < z¯∗l,s , while
if for some i′xi′∗l,s − ei
′
l,s = z¯∗l,s , then for all i ∈ Ixi∗l,s − eil,s > z
¯
∗
l,s , and
1 All our results remain true for more general (non-manipulable) rationing schemes.
2 When prices are competitive, there might be fix-price equilibrium allocations different from the competitive
equilibrium allocation.
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4. for every a ∈ Aˇ, if for some i′yi′∗a = y
¯
∗
a
, then for all i ∈ Iyi∗a < y¯∗a , while if for some
i′ yi′∗a = y¯∗a , then for all i ∈ Iyi∗a > y
¯
∗
a
.
Conditions 1 and 2 are the usual optimization and market clearing conditions. Conditions
3 and 4, together with the convexity of the consumption sets and the quasi-concavity of the
utility functions of individuals, imply that there is no effective rationing, simultaneously, on
both sides of a market. This expresses that we do not depart from the scenario of frictionless
markets that characterizes competitive equilibria with incomplete markets. Markets are
transparent in the sense that it is not possible to find a buyer and a seller in a single market
that could benefit from mutual exchange against the numeraire. The definition of equilibrium
is a special case of the definition given in Drèze (1975) to analyze the consequences of price
rigidities on the allocation of resources in a complete markets setting.
3. Minimal effective feasible allocations of assets
The standard approach to show the existence of an equilibrium is to compactify con-
sumption sets, show upper hemi-continuity of the demand correspondence δi , i ∈ I, and
apply Kakutani’s fixed point theorem to a suitably constructed correspondence. This ap-
proach fails in our set-up as a compactified consumption set does not generate bounds on
assets portfolios that individuals may be willing to hold. This is due to the absence of an
assumption that requires that assets are not collinear.
In the standard incomplete markets model, the presence of collinearity poses no prob-
lems. One restricts attention to an independent subset of assets whose span equals the span
of the asset return matrix. Such an approach fails in our set-up because endogenous ra-
tioning constraints are present. Individuals have good reasons to trade in several collinear
assets if this mitigates the restrictions imposed by rationing. There is no way to select an
independent subset of assets a priori, without possibly limiting the trading opportunities of
the individuals.
In this section, we show that it is still possible to compactify the set of asset portfolios,
without reducing the trading opportunities of individuals. Our aim is basically to consider
only asset portfolios that are minimally effective, i.e. achieve a certain distribution of rev-
enues over future states with minimal trade in the asset market. A further complication is that
one should not consider minimal effective portfolios of assets, but minimal effective fea-
sible allocations of assets. Indeed, if at some given equilibrium ((x∗, y∗), (z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗))
the asset portfolios yi∗, i ∈ I, are replaced by minimal effective asset portfolios, it is not
necessarily the case that the asset markets still clear. Minimal effective feasible allocations
of assets is what is called for.
The effective consumption set of individual i is
X¯ i = {xi ∈ X i : xil,s ≤
∑
i∈I
eil,s , (l, s) ∈ L× S}.
If (x1, . . . , xI ) is a feasible allocation of commodities, then xi ∈ X¯ i for every indi-
vidual. Associated with a consumption plan xi of individual i, there is a revenue plan
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wi(xi) = (wi1(xi1), . . . , wiS(xis))′ ∈ RS , where wis(xis) = p¯s(xis − eis). The set of effective
revenue plans of individual i is
W¯ i = {wi ∈ RS : there is xi ∈ X¯ i such thatwi = wi(xi)}.
The set of effective portfolios of assets of individual i is
Y¯ i = {yi ∈ RA+1 : q¯yi = 0, there iswi ∈ W¯ i such thatwi = R¯yi}.
The sets X¯ i and W¯ i are obviously compact. This is not necessarily so for the set of effective
portfolios of assets of an individual, since the matrix of payoffs of assets need not have full
column rank.
The set of effective feasible allocations of assets for the economy is
Y¯ =
{
y ∈
∏
i∈I
Y¯ i :
∑
i∈I
yi = 0
}
.
Equivalently, y ∈ Y¯ if there is wi ∈ W¯ i , i ∈ I, such that
My = (w1′ , . . . , wI ′ , 0, 0)′,
where
M =


R¯ 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 R¯
q¯ 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 q¯
IA+1 · · · IA+1


,
and IA+1 denotes the unit matrix of dimension A + 1. The matrix M is of dimension
(IS + I + A+ 1)× I (A+ 1).
The set of minimal effective feasible allocations of assets is
Yˆ = {y¯ ∈ Y¯ : ∃y ∈ Y¯ with R¯yi = R¯y¯i , i ∈ I, sign(y) ∈ sign(y¯), |y| < |y¯|},
where sign(x) denotes the sign vector of x, Sign(x) a set of sign vectors related to x as
specified below, and |x| the absolute value vector associated with the vector x. A component
of sign(x) is 1, 0 or −1 if the corresponding component of x is > 0, 0 or < 0, respectively.
The set Sign(x) consists of those sign vectors v for which a component of v is 1 or 0 if
the corresponding component of sign(x) is 1, a component of v is 0 if the corresponding
component of sign(x) is 0, and a component of v is−1 or 0 if the corresponding component
of sign(x)is −1. A component of |x| is the absolute value of the corresponding compo-
nent of x. The set Yˆ contains the effective feasible allocations of assets that are minimal.
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There is no effective feasible allocation of assets such that at least one individual could
attain the same revenue plan with less trade, in absolute value, in at least one of the assets.
In the analysis of the set of equilibria of an economy, there is no loss of generality to
restrict attention to minimal effective feasible allocations of assets in the following sense.
If ((x∗, y∗), (z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗)) is an equilibrium for E at prices (p¯, q¯), then there is yˆ ∈ Yˆ
such that ((x∗, yˆ), (z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗)) is an equilibrium for E at prices (p¯, q¯). Our aim is to
show that Yˆ is bounded.
Since M need not have full column rank, the left-inverse of M may not exist. By the
singular value decomposition, there exist orthogonal matrices U , of dimension (I (S+1)+
A + 1) × (I (S + 1) + A + 1), and V , of dimension I (A + 1) × I (A + 1), such that
U ′MV =  , where  is a matrix of dimension (I (S + 1) + A + 1) × I (A + 1) with
non-negative elements (σ1, . . . , σI (A+1)) on the diagonal and zero off-diagonal elements.3
Moreover, there is r such that the first r elements of (σ1, . . . , σI (A+1)) are positive and
the others are zero. The Moore–Penrose inverse of M is defined by M+ = V +U ′, where
 + is a matrix of dimension I (A+ 1)× (I (S + 1)+ A+ 1) with non-negative elements
(1/σ1, . . . , 1/σr , 0, . . . , 0) on the diagonal and zero off-diagonal elements.
An important property of the Moore–Penrose inverse is the following. Consider some
z ∈ RI (S+1)+A+1. If yR = M+z, then yR is an element in the row space of M such that
z = MyR , and yR is the unique element of the row space of M with this property.
Lemma 3.1. The set Yˆ is bounded.
Proof. If Yˆ is not bounded, then there exists a sequence (yn ∈ Yˆ : n = 1, . . . ) such that
||yn||∞ ≥ n. We define wn = ((R¯y1n)′, . . . , (R¯yIn)′)′. Since W¯ i is compact, there is no
loss of generality in assuming that the sequence (wn ∈ RIS : n = 1, . . . ) is convergent.
Moreover, without loss of generality, sign(yn) is independent of n.
yR,n = M+(w′n, 0, 0)′ and yN,n = yn − yR,n, for n = 1, . . .
The sequence (yR,n : n = 1, . . . ) is convergent, and therefore bounded. Since (yn ∈ Yˆ :
n = 1, . . . ) is unbounded, without loss of generality, the sequence(
1
||yN,n||∞ yN,n : n = 1, . . .
)
is well-defined and convergent, with limit y¯N . Evidently, My¯N = 0, and there is i′ such
that y¯i′N = 0.
Moreover, y¯iN,a = 0 implies limn→∞|yin,a| = ∞, sign(yin,a) > 0 implies y¯iN,a ≥ 0,
sign(yin,a) = 0 implies y¯iN,a = 0, and sign(yin,a) < 0 implies y¯iN,a ≤ 0.
So, there exists n′ such that for n ≥ n′, sign(yn − y¯N ) = sign(yn).
Furthermore, for n ≥ n′, M(yn − y¯N ) = Myn, whereas |yin,a − y¯iN,a| ≤ |yin,a| and there
is a′ such that |yi′
n,a′ − y¯i
′
N,a′ | < |yi
′
n,a′ |.
Hence, for n ≥ n′, yn /∈ Yˆ , a contradiction. 
3 An orthogonal matrix is a matrix with orthonormal columns, so both U ′U and V ′V are identity matrices.
P.J.J. Herings, H. Polemarchakis / Journal of Mathematical Economics 37 (2002) 133–155 141
Even when arbitrage possibilities are present, it is possible to restrict attention to a
bounded set of asset allocations. Since Yˆ is bounded, there exists αˆ > 0 such that ||y||∞ <
αˆ for all y ∈ Yˆ .
4. The existence of equilibria
To show the existence of equilibrium, it is essential that budget constraints hold with
equality. Since the utility functions of individuals are weakly monotonically increasing
in the numeraire commodity, there is no loss of generality in assuming that all second
period budget constraints hold with equality. For the first period budget constraint, ei-
ther one imposes this condition directly on the budget set, or one makes the following
assumption.
A4. The numeraire asset satisfies R¯·A+1 ≥ 0.
Since the utility functions of individuals are weakly monotonically increasing in all
numeraire commodities, R¯·A+1 ≥ 0 implies that the numeraire asset is weakly desirable,
so without loss of generality the budget constraint of the individual in the market for assets
is satisfied with equality.
It can be verified that if first period consumption is present, assumption A4 is automati-
cally satisfied if the model with first period consumption is rewritten into the one without
first period consumption.
At a rationing scheme (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯), the exact budget set β˜i (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯) of individual i is
the set of elements (xi, yi) ∈ βi(z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯) that satisfy the budget constraint in every state
with equality: q¯yi = 0 and p¯s(xis − eis) = R¯s·yi . The exact demand set δ˜i (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯) of the
individual is the set of utility maximizing elements (xi, yi) in β˜i (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯).
Non-emptiness of δi(z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯) implies non-emptiness of δ˜i (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯), since the util-
ity function is weakly monotonically increasing in the numeraire commodity in every
state, and because of Assumption A4. Nevertheless, δ˜i (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯) can be a proper sub-
set of δi(z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯), since the utility function is not necessarily strictly monotonically
increasing.
Lemma 4.1. If E satisfies A1–A3, then the correspondence δ˜i is non-empty, compact and
convex valued, and upper hemi-continuous.
Proof. For any rationing scheme (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯), (ei, 0) ∈ β˜i (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯), so β˜i (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯) is
non-empty.
It is obvious that β˜i (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯) is closed and convex.
The set of non-numeraire commodities Lˇ×S is partitioned into the subsets of commodi-
ties with positive prices, K+, negative prices, K−, and free commodities, K0. The set of
non-numeraire assets Aˇ is partitioned into the subsets of assets with positive prices, A+,
negative prices, A−, and free assets, A0. For (xi, yi) ∈ β˜i (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯), −y
¯
a
≤ yia ≤ y¯a ,
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a ∈ Aˇ, and
yiA+1 = −
∑
a∈Aˇ
q¯ay
i
a ≥ −
∑
a∈A−
q¯ay
¯
a
−
∑
a∈A+
q¯ay¯a,
yiA+1 = −
∑
a∈Aˇ
q¯ay
i
a ≤ −
∑
a∈A−
q¯ay¯a −
∑
a∈A+
q¯ay
¯
a
,
and, thus, the asset demands are bounded. Moreover,
0 ≤ xil,s ≤ eil,s + z¯l,s , (l, s) ∈ Lˇ× S,
0 ≤ xiL+1,s ≤ eiL+1,s −
∑
(l,s)∈K−
p¯l,s z¯l,s +
∑
(l,s)∈K+
p¯l,se
i
l,s + R¯s·yi, s ∈ S,
and it follows, from the boundedness of the feasible asset demands, that the feasible spot
market demands are bounded as well. Therefore, β˜i (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯) is compact. By the continuity
and quasi-concavity of the utility function, δ˜i (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯) is compact and convex.
Consider a sequence, ((z
¯
n, z¯n, y
¯
n
, y¯n) ∈ −RLS+ × RLS+ × −RA+ × RA+ : n = 1, . . . ) that
converges to (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯). For any sequence ((xin, yin) ∈ δ˜i (z
¯
n, z¯n, y
¯
n
, y¯n) : n = 1, . . . ),
−y
¯
n,a
≤ yin,a ≤ y¯n,a, a ∈ Aˇ,
−
∑
a∈A−
q¯ay
¯
n,a
−
∑
a∈A+
q¯ay¯n,a ≤ yin,A+1 ≤ −
∑
a∈A−
q¯ay¯n,a −
∑
a∈A+
q¯ay
¯
n,a
.
Since limn→∞(y
¯
n
, y¯n) = (y
¯
, y¯), it follows that the sequence (yin : n = 1, . . . ) is bounded.
Similarly, since
0 ≤ xin,l,s ≤ eil,s + z¯n,l,s , (l, s) ∈ Lˇ× S,
0 ≤ xin,L+1,s ≤ eiL+1,s −
∑
(l,s)∈K−
p¯l,s z¯n,l,s +
∑
(l,s)∈K+
p¯l,se
i
l,s + R¯s·yin, s ∈ S,
and since the sequence ((z
¯
n, z¯n) : n = 1, . . . ) is convergent, the sequence (xin : n = 1, . . . )
is bounded. It follows that ((xin, yin) : n = 1, . . . ) has a convergent subsequence, also
denoted ((xin, yin) : n = 1, . . . ), with limit (xˆi , yˆi ) ∈ β˜i (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯).
If there exists (x˜i , y˜i ) ∈ δ˜i (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯), such that ui(x˜i) > ui(xˆi), then K˜− (K˜+) is the set
of non-numeraire commodities for which x˜il,s − eil,s is negative (positive), and A˜− (A˜+) is
the set of non-numeraire assets for which y˜ia is negative (positive). Moreover, for n = 1, . . . ,
λn = min
{
1,
z
¯
n,l,s
x˜il,s − eil,s
, (l, s) ∈ K˜−, z¯n,l,s
x˜il,s − eil,s
, (l, s) ∈ K˜+,
y
¯
n,a
y˜ia
, a ∈ A˜−,
y¯n,a
y˜ia
, a ∈ A˜+
}
, x˜in = ei + λn(x˜i − ei), y˜in = λny˜i .
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Since
q¯y˜in = λnq¯y˜i = 0,
p¯s(x˜
i
n,s − eis) = λnp¯s(x˜is − eis) = λnR¯s y˜i = R¯s y˜in,
x˜in,l,s − eil,s = λn(x˜il,s − eil,s) ≥
z
¯
n,l,s
x˜il,s − eil,s
(x˜il,s − eil,s) = z
¯
n,l,s , (l, s) ∈ K˜−,
x˜in,l,s − eil,s = λn(x˜il,s − eil,s) ≥ 0 ≥ z
¯
n,l,s , (l, s) ∈ (Lˇ× S)\K˜−,
x˜in,l,s − eil,s = λn(x˜il,s − eil,s) ≤
z¯n,l,s
x˜il,s − eil,s
(x˜il,s − eil,s) = z¯n,l,s , (l, s) ∈ K˜+,
x˜in,l,s − eil,s = λn(x˜il,s − eil,s) ≤ 0 ≤ z¯n,l,s , (l, s) ∈ (Lˇ× S)\K˜+,
y
¯
n,a
=
y
¯
n,a
y˜ia
y˜ia ≤ λny˜ia = y˜in,a ≤ 0 ≤ y¯n,a, a ∈ A˜−,
y
¯
n,a
≤ 0 ≤ y˜in,a = λny˜ia ≤
y¯n,a
y˜ia
y˜ia = y¯n,a, a ∈ A˜+,
(x˜in, y˜
i
n) ∈ β˜i (z
¯
n, z¯n, y
¯
n
, y¯n).
Evidently, limn→∞λn = 1, and limn→∞(x˜in, y˜in) = (x˜i , y˜i ). By the continuity of the func-
tion ui , ui(x˜in) > ui(xin) for n sufficiently large, which contradicts (xin, yin) ∈ δ˜i (z
¯
n, z¯n, y
¯
n
,
y¯n). Consequently, δ˜i is upper hemi-continuous. 
The demand of individuals depends in an upper hemi-continuous way on the constraints
they face in the markets of the non-numeraire assets and commodities. It is not necessary to
compactify consumption sets in order to get this result, even though there are no restrictions
whatsoever in the markets of the numeraire assets and the numeraire commodities.
It is more surprising, and more important, that neither interiority assumptions nor a
survival assumption are made with respect to initial endowments. Even though lower
hemi-continuity of the budget correspondence in prices may fail, lower hemi-continuity
in rationing constraints is satisfied.
The set of equilibria for E is not compact, because allocations of assets are not necessarily
bounded, and rationing schemes are not bounded. There is a compact subset of the set of
equilibria that contains all equilibrium allocations.
If ((x∗, y∗), (z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗)) is an equilibrium for E at prices (p¯, q¯), then there is a
minimal effective feasible allocation of assets yˆ ∈ Yˆ satisfying ∑i∈I yˆi = 0, and, for
every individual, R¯yˆi = R¯yi∗, q¯yˆi = q¯yi∗, sign(yˆi) ∈ Sign(yi∗), and |yˆia| ≤ |yi∗a |, for all
a ∈ A. It is not excluded that yˆ = y∗. It follows that (xi∗, yˆi ) ∈ δ˜i (z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗), i ∈ I,
and that ((x∗, yˆ), (z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗)) is an equilibrium.
In the market for a commodity, (l, s) ∈ Lˇ × S, if there is an individual i′ such that
xi
′∗
l,s − ei
′
l,s = z
¯
∗
l,s , then by the definition of an equilibrium, no individual is effectively
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rationed in his demand for commodity (l, s), so xi∗l,s − eil,s < z¯∗l,s , i ∈ I. For a fixed ε > 0,
if z¯l,s = ε +
∑
i∈I eil,s , then x
i∗
l,s − eil,s < z¯l,s , i ∈ I. If there is an individual, i′, such that
xi
′∗
l,s − ei
′
l,s = z¯∗l,s , then no individual is effectively rationed in his supply for commodity
(l, s), so xi∗l,s − eil,s > z
¯
∗
l,s , i ∈ I. If z
¯
l,s = −ε−
∑
i∈I eil,s , then x
i∗
l,s − eil,s > −z
¯
l,s , i ∈ I.
In the market for some asset a ∈ Aˇ, if there is an individual i′ such that yˆi′a = y
¯
a
, then no
individual is effectively rationed in his demand for asset a, yˆia < y¯∗a , i ∈ I. Since yˆia < αˆ,
if y¯a = αˆ, then yˆia < y¯a , i ∈ I. If there is an individual i′ such that yˆi
′
a = y¯∗a , then no
individual is effectively rationed in his supply for asset a, yˆia > y
¯
∗
a
, i ∈ I. Since yˆia > −αˆ,
if y
¯
a
= −αˆ, then yˆia > y
¯
a
, i ∈ I.
In conclusion, if ((x∗, y∗), (z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗)) is an equilibrium, then there is an equilibrium
((x∗, yˆ), (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯)) with ||(z
¯
, z¯)||∞ bounded by
∑
i∈I ei + ε, ||(y
¯
, y¯)||∞ bounded by αˆ,
||x∗||∞ bounded by
∑
i∈I ei and ||yˆ||∞ bounded by αˆ. We restrict our attention to rationing
schemes and allocations that satisfy these bounds.
The unit cube of dimension K is CK = {r ∈ RK : 0 ≤ rk ≤ 1, k = 1, . . . , K}. The
functions (z
¯
, z¯) : CLS →−RLS+ × RLS+ and (y
¯
, y¯) : CA →−RA+ × RA+ are defined by
z
¯
l,s (r) = −min
{
2rl,s
(∑
i∈I
eil,s + ε
)
,
∑
i∈I
eil,s + ε
}
, (l, s) ∈ Lˇ× S,
z¯l,s(r) = min
{(
2 − 2rl,s
) (∑
i∈I
eil,s + ε
)
,
∑
i∈I
eil,s + ε
}
, (l, s) ∈ Lˇ× S,
y
¯
a
(ρ) = −min{2ρaαˆ, αˆ}, a ∈ Aˇ,
y¯a(ρ) = min{(2 − 2ρa)αˆ, αˆ}, a ∈ Aˇ,
for a fixed ε > 0.
Attention is restricted to rationing schemes in the image of the functions (z
¯
, z¯) and
(y
¯
, y¯). The state of the commodity markets is described by r ∈ CLS and the state of the asset
markets by ρ ∈ CA. If 0 ≤ rl,s ≤ 1/2, then there may be supply rationing in the market of
commodity (l, s), while demand rationing is excluded by putting z¯l,s(r) =
∑
i∈I eil,s + ε;
if 1/2 ≤ rl,s ≤ 1, then there may be demand rationing in the market of commodity (l, s),
while supply rationing is excluded by putting z
¯
l,s (r) = −
∑
i∈I eil,s − ε. If 0 ≤ ρa ≤ 1/2,
then there may be supply rationing in the market of asset a, while demand rationing is
excluded by putting y¯a(ρ) = αˆ; if 1/2 ≤ ρa ≤ 1, then there may be demand rationing in
the market of asset a, while supply rationing is excluded by putting y
¯
a
(ρ) = −αˆ.
The correspondences δˆi , i ∈ I, and ζˆ , with domain CLS × CA are defined by
δˆi (r, ρ) = δ˜i (z
¯
(r), z¯(r), y
¯
(ρ), y¯(ρ)),
ζˆ (r, ρ) =
∑
i∈I
δˆi (r, ρ)−
{∑
i∈I
ei, 0
}
.
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The correspondence δˆi is a restriction of the correspondence δ˜i , with rationing schemes
being parametrized by the sets CLS and CA.
Lemma 4.2. If E satisfies A1–A4, then, if 0 ∈ ζˆ (r∗, ρ∗), there exists (xi∗, yˆi )∈ δˆi (r∗, ρ∗),
i ∈ I, such that yˆ ∈ Yˆ and ((x∗, yˆ), (z
¯
(r∗), z¯(r∗), y
¯
(ρ∗), y¯(ρ∗))) is an equilibrium for E .
If ((x∗, y∗), (z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗)) is an equilibrium for E , then there exists (r∗, ρ∗) ∈ CLS × CA
such that 0 ∈ ζˆ (r∗, ρ∗) and there exists yˆ ∈ Yˆ such that (xi∗, yˆi ) ∈ δˆi (r∗, ρ∗), i ∈ I.
Proof. If (r∗, ρ∗) ∈ CLS × CA is such that 0 ∈ ζˆ (r∗, ρ∗), then there exists (xi∗, yi) ∈
δ˜i (z
¯
(r∗), z¯(r∗), y
¯
(ρ∗), y¯(ρ∗)), i ∈ I, such that ∑i∈I xi∗ = ∑i∈I ei and ∑i∈I yi = 0.
There is a minimal effective feasible allocation of assets yˆ ∈ Yˆ , such that ∑i∈I yˆi = 0
and, for every individual, R¯yˆi = R¯yi , q¯yˆi = q¯yi , sign(yˆi) ∈ sign(yi), and |yˆia| ≤ |yia|,
a ∈ A. This implies that (xi∗, yˆi ) ∈ δ˜i (z
¯
(r∗), z¯(r∗), y
¯
(ρ∗), y¯(ρ∗)) and that (1) and (2) of
the definition of an equilibrium are satisfied by ((x∗, yˆ), (z
¯
(r∗), z¯(r∗), y
¯
(ρ∗), y¯(ρ∗))).
If, for (l, s) ∈ Lˇ × S, xi′∗l,s − ei
′
l,s = z
¯
l,s (r
∗) for some i′ ∈ I, then z
¯
l,s (r
∗) ≥ −ei′l,s >
−∑i∈I eil,s − ε. So r∗l,s < 1/2, and z¯l,s(r∗) =∑i∈I eil,s + ε. It follows that xi∗l,s − eil,s <
z¯l,s(r
∗), for every individual.
If, for (l, s) ∈ Lˇ × S, xi′∗l,s − ei
′
l,s = z¯l,s(r∗) for some i′ ∈ I, then z¯l,s(r∗) ≤ xi
′∗
l,s <∑
i∈I eil,s + ε. So r∗l,s > 1/2, and z
¯
l,s (r
∗) = −∑i∈I eil,s − ε. It follows that xi∗l,s − eil,s >
z
¯
l,s (r
∗), for every individual.
If, for a ∈ Aˇ, yˆi′a = y
¯
a
(ρ∗) for some i′ ∈ I, then y
¯
a
(ρ∗) > −αˆ since yˆ ∈ Yˆ . So
ρ∗l,s < 1/2, and y¯a(ρ∗) = αˆ. It follows immediately that yˆia < y¯a(ρ∗), for every individual.
If, for a ∈ Aˇ, yˆi′a = y¯a(ρ∗) for some i′ ∈ I, then y
¯
a
(ρ∗) < αˆ since yˆ ∈ Yˆ . So ρ∗l,s > 1/2,
and y
¯
a
(ρ∗) = −αˆ. Again, it follows immediately that yˆia > y
¯
a
(ρ∗), for every individual.
Hence, (3) and (4) are satisfied as well in the definition of an equilibrium.
For the second part of the lemma, one supposes that ((x∗, y∗), (z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗
, y¯∗)) is an
equilibrium for E . It has been argued in Section 3 that there exists yˆ ∈ Yˆ such that
((x∗, yˆ), (z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗)) is an equilibrium for E , so in particular (xi∗, yˆi ) ∈ δi(z
¯
∗, z¯∗,
y
¯
∗, y¯∗), i ∈ I. The equality of supply and demand in all markets implies (xi∗, yˆi ) ∈
δ˜i (z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗), i ∈ I. If there is effective supply rationing in the market for commodity
(l, s) ∈ Lˇ × S, then let r∗l,s be such that z
¯
l,s (r
∗) = z
¯
∗
l,s . If there is effective demand ra-
tioning in the market for commodity (l, s) ∈ Lˇ× S, then r∗l,s is set so that z¯l,s(r∗) = z¯∗l,s .
For all other commodities (l, s), the ones without effective rationing, r∗l,s = 1/2. If there is
effective supply rationing in the market for asset a ∈ Aˇ, then ρ∗a is set so that z
¯
a(ρ
∗) = z
¯
∗
a .
If there is effective demand rationing in the market for asset a ∈ Aˇ, then ρ∗a is such that
z¯a(ρ
∗) = z¯∗a . For all other assets a, the ones without effective rationing, define ρ∗a = 1/2. It
follows from the construction of the functions (z
¯
, z¯, y
¯
, y¯) that (xi∗, yˆi ) ∈ δˆi (r∗, ρ∗), i ∈ I,
so 0 ∈ ζˆ (r∗, ρ∗). 
The preparatory work is complete. It remains to show that there exists a zero point of ζˆ
and thereby, an equilibrium. By Lemma 4.2, this implies the existence of an equilibrium
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for E . Moreover, the construction used implies that no equilibrium allocations are lost
by restricting attention to zero points of ζˆ . Since there is no rationing in the market of the
numeraire asset nor in the market of the numeraire commodities, existence of an equilibrium
is not obvious.
Theorem 4.3. If E satisfies A1–A4, then an equilibrium for E at prices (p¯, q¯) exists.
Proof. The correspondence ζˆ is non-empty, compact, convex valued and upper hemi-
continuous. It follows that the set ζˆ (CLS × CA) is compact.
The set ZY is compact, convex, and it contains ζˆ (CLS × CA). The correspondence µ :
ZY → CLS × CA is defined by
µ(z, y) = arg max


∑
(l,s)∈Lˇ×S
rl,szl,s +
∑
a∈Aˇ
ρaya : r ∈ CLS, ρ ∈ CA

 .
The correspondence ϕ : ZY × CLS × CA → ZY × CLS × CA is defined by
ϕ(z, y, r, ρ) = ζˆ (r, ρ)× µ(z, y).
It is a non-empty, compact, convex valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence defined
on a non-empty, compact, convex set. By Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, ϕ has a fixed
point, (z∗, y∗, r∗, ρ∗).
If for some a ∈ Aˇ, y∗a < 0, then by the definition ofµ, ρ∗a = 0, so y∗a ≥ 0, a contradiction.
If for some a ∈ Aˇ, y∗a > 0, then by the definition of µ, ρ∗a = 1, so y∗a ≤ 0, a contradiction.
Consequently, y∗a = 0, for all a ∈ Aˇ. Moreover, y∗A+1 = −
∑
a∈Aˇ q¯ay
∗
a = 0.
If for some (l, s) ∈ Lˇ × S, z∗l,s < 0, then by the definition of µ, r∗l,s = 0, so z∗l,s ≥ 0,
a contradiction. If for some (l, s) ∈ Lˇ× S, z∗l,s > 0, then by the definition of µ, r∗l,s = 1,
so z∗l,s ≤ 0, a contradiction. Consequently, z∗l,s = 0, for all (l, s) ∈ Lˇ × S. Moreover, for
every s ∈ S, z∗L+1,s = −
∑
(l,s)∈Lˇ×S p¯l,sz
∗
l,s + R¯s·y∗ = 0.
It follows that 0 ∈ ζˆ (r∗, ρ∗), and, hence, an equilibrium exists. 
It has been argued before that the conditions under which equilibria exist are very weak.
No restrictions are made on the prices of assets and commodities, apart from the requirement
that the prices of the numeraire assets and the numeraire commodities are 1. The prices of
assets do not have to satisfy the no-arbitrage conditions. Evidently, if the no-arbitrage
condition is violated, one expects that all traders want to operate on the same side of the
asset markets that are needed to construct an arbitrage portfolio. If indeed all traders are on
the same side of an asset market, then no trade is possible in such an asset, as there are no
partners to trade with. Although it is shown in Section 6 that this intuition is not entirely
correct, it still indicates why violation of the no-arbitrage condition is not inconsistent with
existence of equilibrium. Endogenous bounds on trade that arise because of a lack of trading
partners restore the existence of equilibrium.
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5. Hart’s counterexample
To gain some additional insight into our equilibrium concept, it is fruitful to analyze the
counterexample to existence of a competitive equilibrium as presented in Hart (1975). We
consider the economy E = ((X i , ui, ei)i∈I , R(p, q)) with two commodities (L = 1) in
each of the two states (S = 2), two individuals (I = 2) and two assets (A = 1). The utility
functions of the individuals are given by
ui(xi) =
(
1
2
)
ui1(x
i
·1)+
(
1
2
)
ui2(x
i
·2),
where
u1s (x
1
·s) =
(
3
4
)
ln (x11,s)+
(
1
4
)
ln (x12,s)
u2s (x
2
·s) =
(
1
4
)
ln (x21,s)+
(
3
4
)
ln (x22,s),
and endowments are
e1 = (e1·1, e1·2) =
((
3
4 ,
3
4
)
,
(
1
4 ,
1
4
))
e2 = (e2·1, e2·2) =
((
1
4 ,
1
4
)
,
(
3
4 ,
3
4
))
.
Each of the two future states occurs with probability 1/2, individual 1 spends 75% of his
total income in each state on commodity 1, and individual 2 spends 75% of his total income
on commodity 2. Here, income in a state is the income that results after transactions in the
asset markets in the first period. Household 1 has high endowments in state 1 and will try to
shuffle income to the other state by appropriate transactions on the asset markets, whereas
the reverse holds for agent 2.
Two assets are traded, the futures for commodities 1 and 2, respectively. The asset return
matrix in nominal terms is given by
R(p, q) =
[
p1,1 p2,1
p1,2 p2,2
]
.
The economy E has no competitive equilibrium, which follows from the arguments provided
by Hart (1975). If, at competitive equilibrium prices (p∗, q∗), R(p∗, q∗) has full rank, mar-
kets are complete; the allocational equivalence with a complete markets equilibrium implies
that the equilibrium allocation is given by (x1∗, x2∗) = ((3/4, 1/4, 3/4, 1/4), (1/4, 3/4,
1/4, 3/4)). Optimization within each state implies that p∗1,1 = p∗2,1 and p∗1,2 = p∗2,2.
Then the rank of R(p∗, q∗) is one, a contradiction to the hypothesis that it has full rank.
If R(p∗, q∗) has rank one, the no-arbitrage condition on prices of assets implies that it is
not possible to transfer income from one state into the other one by trade in assets. After a
certain state is realized, the economy is like a standard economy with two commodities. It
can be verified that p1,1 = (5/3)p2,1 and p1,2 = (3/5)p2,2 is the only possibility to clear
the spot markets. But then R(p, q) has full rank, contradicting our supposition.
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As before, the price of the second commodity is normalized to 1. If markets were complete,
then the competitive equilibrium price system for commodities would be given by p¯ =
((1, 1), (1, 1)). The prices of the futures are then determined by a no-arbitrage condition
and equal q¯ = (1, 1). In the economy E this does not constitute a competitive equilibrium,
as markets are not complete if all commodity prices equal to 1. Endogenous restrictions on
trade emerge at those prices.
The requirement q¯yi = 0 implies yi2 = −yi1. The structure of the asset return matrix is
such that no income can be transferred from one state into another, and any yi such that
yi2 = −yi1 leads to the same consumption possibilities for an individual in the second period.
Market clearing implies y2 = −y1. Any feasible allocation of assets ((y11 ,−y11), (−y11 , y11))
can be replaced by the minimal effective allocation of assets ((0, 0), (0, 0)) ∈ Yˆ . Without
effective rationing, the demand for commodities of individual 1 in state 1 is (9/8, 3/8)
and in state 2 (3/8, 1/8). Without effective rationing, the demand for commodities of
individual 2 is ((1/8, 3/8), (3/8, 9/8)). There is excess demand for commodity 1 in state 1
and excess supply for commodity 1 in state 2, which is also consistent with our observation
before that a price of 5/3 for commodity 1 in state 1 and a price of 3/5 for commodity
1 in state 2 is needed to clear the markets. The net demand possibilities of individual 1
for commodity 1 in state 1 are determined by the net supply of individual 2 and equal
1/8. Similarly, the net supply possibilities of individual 2 for commodity 1 in state 2 are
determined by the net demand of individual 1 and equal 1/8 as well. An equilibrium for
the economy E at prices p¯ = ((1, 1), (1, 1)) and q¯ = (1, 1) is ((x∗, y∗), (z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗))
such that x∗1 = ((7/8, 5/8), (3/8, 1/8)), x∗2 = ((1/8, 3/8), (5/8, 7/8)), y∗1 = (0, 0),
y∗2 = (0, 0), z¯∗1,1 = 1/8, z
¯
∗
1,2 = −1/8, and the other components of z
¯
∗ and z¯∗, as well as
y
¯
∗ and y¯∗ are chosen as not to be binding.
Another interesting price system to analyze is the one where period 2 commodity prices
equilibrate the markets, given that no trade takes place in the asset markets in the first period.
That is, p¯ = ((5/3, 1), (3/5, 1)), so
R¯ =
[
5
3 1
3
5 1
]
.
Suppose again that q¯ = (1, 1). The first period budget constraint implies yi2 = −yi1. If
no further constraints on supply and demand are present, then optimization of individual
1 at prices p¯ and q¯ leads to a demand x1 = ((3/5, 1/3), (1, 1/5)) for commodities and
y1 = (−1, 1) for assets. The payoffs of assets enable the first individual to transfer income
to the second state where he is poor, which is achieved by going short in asset 1 and long in
asset 2. The reverse happens for individual 2, who has a demand x2 = ((1/5, 1), (1/3, 3/5))
for commodities and y2 = (1,−1) for assets if there is no effective rationing.
The asset markets are effectively complete, but the price for commodity 1 in state 1
is higher than the complete markets competitive equilibrium value, whereas the price for
commodity 1in state 2 is lower. It is not surprising that there is excess supply of commodity
1 in state 1 and excess demand for commodity 1 in state 2. Supply of commodity 1 in state 2
by individual 2 falls short of demand by individual 1 by a rather large amount, which causes
individual 1 to be effectively rationed in his demand for that commodity. As a consequence,
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individual 1 transfers less income to state 2, and therefore supplies less of asset 1 in the first
period. It also causes individual 1 to demand more of both commodities in state 1. Supply
of commodity 1 in state 1 by individual 2 will be constrained by the demand of individual 1,
but the constraint will not bite too much as as an unconstrained individual 2 is not supplying
much of that commodity. If individual 2 takes the constraint on the supply of commodity
(1,1) into account, his demand for asset 1 will be somewhat smaller than 1. Since supply of
asset 1 by individual 1 is reduced substantially by the prospect of demand rationing in state 2,
individual 2 becomes effectively rationed in his demand for asset 1. At constraints z
¯
∗
1,1 = 0,
z¯∗1,2 = 1/3, y¯∗1 = 1/2, the demand of individual 1 is x∗1 = ((3/4, 5/12), (7/12, 1/4)),
y∗1 = (−1/2, 1/2), and the demand of individual 2 is x∗2 = ((1/4, 7/12), (5/12, 3/4)),
y∗2 = (1/2,−1/2): these constraints indeed induce an equilibrium.
If p¯ = ((5/3, 1), (3/5, 1)), then the price for commodity (1,1) is high and the price
for commodity (1,2) low relative to a complete markets competitive equilibrium. It is not
surprising that in our notion of equilibrium supply rationing arises in the first market and de-
mand rationing in the second. At those prices, individuals utilize the assets to transfer income
from one state to another. Even though the prices p¯ = ((1, 1), (1, 1)) are in accordance with
a complete markets competitive equilibrium, whereas the prices p¯ = ((5/3, 1), (3/5, 1))
are not, the spanning opportunities offered by the latter, make the equilibrium at those
prices Pareto dominate the equilibrium at the former. It can be verified that an increase of
the consumption of all commodities in the former equilibrium by 15% keeps it inferior to
the latter.
6. Arbitrage
An arbitrage portfolio yˆ is such that q¯yˆ ≤ 0, while R¯yˆ > 0. Prices of assets allow
for arbitrage if an arbitrage portfolio exists. Theorem 4.3 shows that equilibria exist when
prices of assets allow for arbitrage. But the presence of arbitrage opportunities imposes
restrictions on rationing in equilibrium.
The utility function of an individual is said to be monotonically increasing in the numeraire
commodity at every state of the world if, for all xi ∈ X i , for s ∈ S, for k ≥ 0, ui(xi +
k1(L+1)s) > ui(xi).
Proposition 6.1. IfE satisfies A1–A3 and the utility function of every individual is monoton-
ically increasing in the numeraire commodity at every state of the world, then, if ((x∗, y∗),
(z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗)) is an equilibrium for E and yˆ is an arbitrage portfolio, there exists for
every individual, i, an asset, a ∈ Aˇ, such that either yˆa < 0 and yi∗a = y
¯
∗
a
, or yˆa > 0 and
yi∗a = y¯∗a .
Proof. If the statement is false, then there is an individual, i, such that, for every a ∈ Aˇ,
if yˆa > 0, yi∗a < y¯∗a , and if yˆa < 0, then yi∗a > y
¯
∗
a
. It follows that, for some λ > 0,
y
¯
∗
a
≤ yi∗a + λyˆa ≤ y¯∗a , for all a ∈ Aˇ. But then, the pair of a consumption plan and
a portfolio (xi, yi) defined by yi = yi∗ + λyˆ, xil,s = xi∗l,s , for all (l, s) ∈ Lˇ × S, and
xiL+1,s = xi∗L+1,s + λR¯s yˆ, for all s ∈ S, is an element of the budget set βi(z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗).
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Since the utility function is monotonically increasing in the numeraire commodity at every
state of the world, ui(xi) > ui(xi∗), a contradiction. 
Proposition 6.1 makes precise what sort of endogenous limitations on trade emerge when
arbitrage possibilities exist. If arbitrage possibilities are present, then each individual will
face constraints on trade in some of the asset markets that are needed to construct an arbitrage
portfolio. These constraints are related to the side of the market on which one has to be to
perform the arbitrage. The intuition behind this result is clear. If some individual faces no
constraints, it would add an arbitrage portfolio to its existing portfolio of assets and thereby
increase its utility.
When an arbitrage opportunity is present, all individuals try to profit from it. As a result,
it seems likely that all individuals would be on the same side of all asset markets that are
used in the arbitrage. The endogenous constraints on trade that emerge would then be such
that no trade in these markets is possible.
At an equilibrium, ((x∗, y∗), (z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗)), the market for asset a is closed if y
¯
∗
a
= 0
or y¯∗a = 0. If a market is not closed, then it is open. In particular, the market for assetA+1 is
always open. The set of all assets for which markets are open isA◦. The associated effective
prices of assets are q◦, an effective portfolio is y◦, and the matrix of effective payoffs of
assets is R◦. An effective arbitrage portfolio yˆ◦ is such that q◦yˆ◦ ≤ 0, while R¯◦yˆ◦ > 0. The
intuition of the previous paragraph suggests that effective arbitrage portfolios do not exist.
Proposition 6.2. IfE satisfies A1–A3 and the utility function of every individual is monoton-
ically increasing in the numeraire commodity at every state of the world, then, if ((x∗, y∗),
(z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗)) is an equilibrium for E at which at most two asset markets are open,
|A◦| ≤ 2, there is no effective arbitrage portfolio.
Proof. If |A◦| = 1, the argument is trivial since the only open asset market is the one of
the numeraire asset. The existence of an effective arbitrage portfolio is then contradictory
to the existence of an equilibrium.
If |A◦| = 2, then there exists a non-numeraire asset, a¯ ∈ A◦. If yˆ◦ is an effective arbitrage
portfolio, then either yˆ◦a¯ = 0 or yˆ◦a¯ = 0. If yˆ◦a¯ = 0, then q◦yˆ◦ ≤ 0 and R◦yˆ◦ > 0 implies
R·A+1 < 0, so an equilibrium does not exist, a contradiction. If yˆ◦a¯ > 0, then Proposition 6.1
implies that yi∗a¯ = y¯∗a¯ , for all i ∈ I. Thus, by market clearing, y¯∗a¯ = 0, and the market for
asset a¯ is not open, a contradiction. If yˆ◦a¯ < 0, it follows by a similar argument that y
¯
∗
a¯
= 0,
the market for asset a¯ is not open, again leading to a contradiction. 
Although the result is rather minimal in the sense that it considers only the case with
at most two open asset markets, it confirms standard intuition. The existence of effective
arbitrage portfolios makes all individuals operate on the same side of the markets involved
in the arbitrage, which, as a consequence, close.
7. An example permitting effective arbitrage portfolios
The result does not extend to equilibria with three or more open asset markets. With three
assets and three individuals, it is even possible that at an equilibrium one individual holds
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an arbitrage portfolio that the other two individuals, together, supply. It is surprising that
equilibria with effective arbitrage opportunities may exist.
In the economy E = ((X i , ui, ei)i∈I , R¯), there is one commodity (L = 0) at each of
the three states (S = 3), three individuals (I = 3) and three assets (A = 2). The utility
functions are given by
ui(xi) = aixi1 + bixi2 + cixi3,
where
(a1, b1, c1) = (2, 1, 2),
(a2, b2, c2) = (1, 2, 2),
(a3, b3, c3) = (1, 1, 2),
and endowments are
e1 = (e11, e12, e13) = (3, 9, 3),
e2 = (e21, e22, e23) = (9, 3, 3),
e3 = (e31, e32, e33) = (5, 5, 5).
Prices of commodities and assets are
p¯ = (1, 1, 1),
q¯ = (1/2, 1/2, 1).
The matrix of payoffs of assets is
R¯ =


−4 2 −2
2 −4 −2
2 2 6

 .
The economy satisfies Assumptions A1–A3, so Propositions 6.1 and 6.2 apply. At an equi-
librium with one or two open asset markets, an effective arbitrage portfolio does not exist.
Since there are three assets in the economy, Proposition 6.2 does not cover all possible
cases.
An arbitrage portfolio yˆ satisfies
−4yˆ1 + 2yˆ2 − 2yˆ3 ≥ 0,
2yˆ1 − 4yˆ2 − 2yˆ3 ≥ 0,
2yˆ1 + 2yˆ2 + 6yˆ3 ≥ 0,
with at least one strict inequality, and
yˆ1 + yˆ2 + 2yˆ3 ≤ 0.
For λ > 0, the portfolio yˆλ = (−λ,−λ, λ) is an arbitrage portfolio. It holds that R¯yˆλ =
(0, 0, 2λ)′ > 0, while q¯yˆλ = 0.
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Although the individuals have to choose between three assets and three commodities,
using the budget constraints, it is easily seen that they actually face a two-dimensional
decision problem. The budget constraint of individual i holds with equality, and yi3 =
−(1/2)yi1 − (1/2)yi2. Since
R¯


yi1
yi2
− 12yi1 − 12yi2

 =


l − 3yi1 + 3yi2
3yi1 − 3yi2
−yi1 − yi2

 ,
an individual with a utility function ui(xi) = aixi1 + bixi2 + cixi3 solves the optimization
problem
max(−3ai + 3bi − ci)yi1 + (3ai − 3bi − ci)yi2,
s.t. yi1 − yi2 ≤
1
3
ei1,
yi2 − yi1 ≤
1
3
ei2,
yi1 + yi2 ≤ ei3,
y
¯
1 ≤ yi1 ≤ y¯1,
y
¯
2 ≤ yi2 ≤ y¯2.
If ((x∗, y∗), (z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗)) is an equilibrium for E at prices (p¯, q¯), since, for any λ > 0,
yλ is an arbitrage portfolio, it follows by Proposition 6.1 that all individuals are effectively
rationed in the supply of asset 1 or asset 2. If no individual is effectively rationed in the
supply of asset 2, then every individual is effectively rationed in the supply of asset 1, and
market clearing implies that y
¯
∗
1 = 0. Irrespective of rationing in the demand of asset 2,
individual 2 supplies 2 units of asset 2 and individual 3 supply 4/3 units of asset 2, whereas
individual 1 demands at most 2 units of this asset, which is a contradiction. Similarly,
there is no equilibrium without effective rationing in the supply of asset market 1. Con-
sequently, in every equilibrium, there is effective rationing in the supply of both assets.
Condition 4 in the definition of an equilibrium implies that there is no effective rationing
in the demand of any asset. Therefore, the demand for assets 1 and 2, and, hence, for asset
3 as well as for commodities, is a function of the rationing scheme on the supplies of the
assets. The derivation of the demand functions is facilitated by the graphic illustration of
the decision problem of individual i depicted in Fig. 1, where the rationing scheme is taken
equal to y
¯
= (−1,−1).
It is immediately verified that the situation depicted in Fig. 1 constitutes an equilib-
rium ((x∗, y∗), (z
¯
∗, z¯∗, y
¯
∗, y¯∗)), with z
¯
∗ and z¯∗ not coming into play since there are no
non-numeraire commodities, y
¯
∗ = (−1,−1)′, y¯∗ > (2, 2)′ (the exact choice does not
matter). Then x1∗ = (12, 0, 2)′, x2∗ = (0, 12, 2)′, x3∗ = (5, 5, 7)′, y1∗ = (−1, 2,−1/2)′,
y2∗ = (2,−1, −1/2)′, and y3∗ = (−1,−1, 1)′. This describes the unique equilibrium,
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Fig. 1. Decision problems of the three individuals.
where equilibria are equivalent if they differ only with respect to rationing schemes that are
not effective.
Indeed, the demands of individuals as functions of the rationing scheme on the supplies
are
x1(y
¯
) = (12, 0,min{−2y
¯
1, 6 − 2y
¯
2})′,
y1(y
¯
) =
(
max{y
¯
1, y
¯
2 − 3},max{3 + y
¯
1, y
¯
2},min
{
−11
2
− y
¯
1, 1
1
2
− y
¯
2
})′
,
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x2(y
¯
) = (0, 12,min{−2y
¯
2, 6 − 2y
¯
1})′,
y2(y
¯
) =
(
max{3 + y
¯
2, y
¯
1},max{y
¯
2, y
¯
1 − 3},min
{
−11
2
− y
¯
2, 1
1
2
− y
¯
1
})′
,
x3(y
¯
) = (5 − 3y
¯
1 + 3y
¯
2, 5 + 3y
¯
1 − 3y
¯
2, 5 − y
¯
1 − y
¯
2)
′,
y3(y
¯
) =
(
y
¯
1, y
¯
2,−
1
2
y
¯
1 −
1
2
y
¯
2
)′
.
The equality of supply and demand for assets 1and 2, necessary and sufficient for equilib-
rium, yields
max{y
¯
1, y
¯
2 − 3} + max{3 + y
¯
2, y
¯
1} + y
¯
1 = 0,
max{3 + y
¯
1, y
¯
2} + max{y
¯
2, y
¯
1 − 3} + y
¯
2 = 0.
The unique solution is y
¯
= (−1,−1)′.
At the equilibrium, individuals 1 and 2, together, supply the arbitrage portfolio that
individual 3 holds.
8. Conclusion
At any prices for commodities and assets, with rationing, an equilibrium allocation of
resources exists under weak assumptions. There is no need to resort to a generic argument,
even when markets are incomplete and assets are real or display an even more complicated
dependence on prices. Neither is there a need to make the usual, but unappealing interiority
assumption on endowments.
The equilibrium concept also provides a solution when the no-arbitrage condition on
prices is not satisfied. The logical consequence of the existence of arbitrage portfolios is
that all individuals try to exploit these arbitrage opportunities. This limits the possibilities
to find trading partners needed for the arbitrage, which generates endogenously determined
constraints on such trades. Even though markets clear in our concept of equilibrium, market
clearance generally involves endogenously determined amounts of effective rationing.
Even though arbitrage possibilities are limited by endogenously generated constraints on
trade, it is not necessarily the case that all arbitrage opportunities are eliminated. It is even
possible for an individual to hold an arbitrage portfolio in equilibrium, which is, because of
market clearing, supplied by others. This phenomenon is rather counterintuitive since the
other individuals are not excluded from holding the arbitrage portfolio themselves.
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